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I. INTRODUCTION
In McBee v. Delica, Co.,1 the First Circuit Court of Appeals
developed an analytical framework for determining when a
plaintiff, in bringing a claim under the Lanham Act,2 can estab-
lish subject-matter jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. Cecil
McBee, a highly acclaimed Jazz musician, filed a trademark in-
fringement claim against Delica, Co. Ltd. (Delica), a clothing
company incorporated in Japan.3 Delica employed the name
"Cecil McBee" for its clothing line, printed the name on its t-
shirts, and sold them to teenage girls in Japan. 4 The court held
that, in determining whether the plaintiff has established sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction under the Lanham Act, the first inquiry
is to determine whether the defendant is a United States citi-
zen.5 A negative answer to the question will prove fatal to the
plaintiffs claim, unless he can show that the defendant's activi-
ties had a substantial effect on United States commerce. 6 The
court also held that international comity, the rule that a court
should not render judgments that will conflict with foreign law,
is not a factor in the test for subject-matter jurisdiction but
rather is solely within the judge's discretion in determining
whether the claim should proceed. 7 The court then applied its
test to the facts of the case and found that McBee failed to es-
1 McBee v. Delica, Co., 417 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2005).
2 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006).
3 McBee, 417 F.3d at 115.
4 Id. at 112.
5 Id. at 111.
6 Id.
7 Id.
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tablish subject-matter jurisdiction and, as a result, dismissed
McBee's claims against Delica.s
In rendering its decision, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
fanned the flames in an already brewing controversy within the
arena of trademark law: what is the legal standard for deter-
mining whether a plaintiff has established subject-matter juris-
diction under the Lanham Act against a foreign defendant
whose alleged unlawful activities were conducted wholly
outside the United States? While the issue initially appears
rather mundane, the facts of the case present a singular in-
stance of a larger revolution affecting the entire developed
world. That revolution, not surprisingly, is globalization where,
largely due to the internet, information can span the entire
globe with incredible ease. After all, it would be highly unlikely
that the plaintiff, Cecil McBee, would have discovered the al-
leged unlawful use of his name were it not for the internet. As
such, the courts can expect an increasing number of plaintiffs to
bring claims under the Lanham Act against foreign defendants.
Thus, the more theoretical issue is whether the courts can effec-
tively balance two competing interests - the ability for the stat-
ute to fulfill its intended purpose of regulating and protecting
American citizens at home and abroad and the need to preserve
the paramount value of judicial restraint in which the court
should only hear cases and controversies when it has a true in-
terest in adjudicating the dispute. The narrow issue this Note
will explore is whether the court's analytical framework effec-
tively balances the aforementioned competing interests during
the information age.
Part II of this note will provide the history of subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction analysis under the Lanham Act, including the
various approaches the circuit courts have developed over the
recent decades. Part III will discuss the newly decided case of
McBee v. Delica, Co.,9 specifically the court's analytical frame-
work, its rationale for applying the framework, and the applica-
tion of its rationale to the facts of the case. Part IV will
examine the heart of the issue- whether the court's substantial
effects test can effectively protect American interests abroad
without sacrificing its role as a court that only hears proper fed-
8 Id. at 122-26.
9 McBee, 417 F.3d at 107.
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eral questions. Part V will conclude that the court's test prop-
erly expands the Lanham Act's reach over foreign defendants
without unduly invading upon the sovereignty of foreign na-
tions. This Note will also conclude that Congress should ad-
dress the broader policy question of whether it should amend
the Lanham Act accordingly so that the statute can fully accom-
plish its purpose of protecting domestic trademark holders from
foreign infringement.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Lanham Act
In its most basic form, the Lanham Act 10 bars any person
from using a registered trademark without the consent of the
holder.11 The statute provides a cause of action to the trade-
mark holder whereby the plaintiff can base his claim on false
endorsement by alleging that the unlawful use of the trademark
has falsely misled people into believing that the holder endorses
the defendant's use of the trademark and that such confusion
has caused the plaintiff harm.1 2 Depending on the circum-
stances, the plaintiff can seek injunctive relief, damages, and
attorney's fees against the defendant. 13
While the statute contains specific substantive provisions,
the statute does not provide detailed jurisdictional language.
Congress based the statute on the Commerce Clause, stating
that its purpose is to regulate "commerce within the control of
Congress,"1 4 and defining commerce as "all commerce which
may lawfully be regulated by Congress."1 5 Consequently, the
statute bars the use of infringing marks "in commerce."' 6 While
Congress substantially amended the statute in 1988 and 1999,
the original jurisdictional language remains intact.1 7
10 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006).
11 See id.
12 See id.
13 See id.
14 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
15 Id.
16 15 U.S.C. § 1114.
17 McBee, 417 F.3d at 117 n.5.
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B. Supreme Court Precedent: Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.
In Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.,183 the plaintiff, Bulova Watch
Co. (Bulova), filed a trademark infringement claim under the
Lanham Act for watches sold in Mexico City. The defendant,
Sidney Steele, a United States citizen residing in Texas, pur-
chased the necessary parts from Switzerland and imported
them into Mexico, whereupon he assembled the watches,
stamped them with the "Bulova" mark, and sold them without
Bulova's consent. 19 Steele never imported the watches into the
United States; yet the watches sold in Mexico inevitably crossed
the border and landed in repair shops in towns located immedi-
ately across the United States border. 20
The Supreme Court confronted the issue of whether a
plaintiff could establish subject-matter jurisdiction under a
trademark infringement claim against a United States citizen
for activities conducted wholly outside the country.2 ' The Court
found that the broad jurisdictional language of the Lanham Act
overcame the presumption against extraterritoriality and,
therefore, Congress intended for the statute to apply to activi-
ties conducted outside the United States. 22 As such, the Court
found that the language "all commerce which may lawfully be
regulated by Congress" 23 conferred broad jurisdiction on the
courts when inquiring into subject-matter jurisdiction. 24
The Court then applied this finding to the facts of the case
and concluded that Bulova established subject-matter jurisdic-
tion over Steele. 25 In reaching its holding, the Court found that
it was irrelevant that Bulova did not stamp the watches with
the "Bulova" mark in the United States. 26 Rather, the Court
found it significant that the watches were sold in the United
States, albeit by other people, because they were "essential
steps" 27 in an "unlawful scheme."28 Furthermore, the Court
18 Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
19 Id. at 284-85.
20 Id. at 285.
21 See id. at 284.
22 Id. at 285.
23 Id. at 287 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127).
24 Steele, 344 U.S. at 287.
25 Id. at 286.
26 Id. at 287.
27 Id.
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found that the effect of Steele's unlawful activities radiated be-
yond the Mexican-American border. 29 Thus, the Court chose
not to adopt a formalistic view of the effects of his extraterrito-
rial activities and recognized that conduct occurring in one na-
tion can affect commerce in the United States. Lastly, the
Court addressed the issue of comity and found an absence of
conflict with foreign law because the Mexican courts had "nulli-
fied the Mexican registration of 'Bulova."' 30
The Court has not heard a case clarifying this landmark
decision and has thus burdened the circuit courts with the re-
sponsibility of formulating a clear test that the district courts
must apply in determining whether to hold a foreign defendant
amenable to a Lanham Act claim. As a result, Steele merely
stands for the proposition that the courts, under some circum-
stances, can apply the Lanham Act extraterritorially.
C. The Circuit Courts of Appeal Interpret Steele
1. The Second Circuit
Perhaps the most widely known test for subject-matter ju-
risdiction under the Lanham Act derives from the case of Vanity
Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co.31 In that case, the plaintiff, Van-
ity Fair Mills, Inc. (Vanity Fair Mills), a Pennsylvania corpora-
tion, used the trademark "Vanity Fair" on its underwear. 32 One
year after the United States Patent Office granted use of the
mark "Vanity Fair" to the plaintiff, the defendant, T. Eaton Co.
(T. Eaton), a Canadian corporation engaged in the business of
retail merchandising, obtained a trademark from Canadian au-
thorities that granted the company the lawful use of the "Vanity
Fair" name on its underwear.3 3 Some thirty years later, the de-
fendant ceased to use its own "Vanity Fair" mark and instead
bought women's underwear from the plaintiff in New York be-
28 Id.
29 See id. at 286-87.
30 Id. at 289.
31 Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Easton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956). For a
general outline of the various tests for subject-matter jurisdiction under the Lan-
ham Act, see Erika M. Brown, The Extraterritorial Reach of United States Trade-
mark Law: A Review of Recent Decisions Under the Lanham Act, 9 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 863 (1999).
32 Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 637.
33 Id. at 637-38.
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tween the periods 1945 and 1953. 34 In 1953, the defendant re-
sumed use of the mark and sold the purchased underwear from
the plaintiff bearing the name "Vanity Fair."35 As a result,
Vanity Fair Mills sought to enjoin T. Eaton from using the
"Vanity Fair" mark in both the United States and Canada. 36
Based on its interpretation of Steele, the court first devel-
oped a tripartite test for subject-matter jurisdiction analysis.
First, the defendant's activities must have a substantial effect
on United States commerce.37 Second, the defendant must be a
United States citizen. 38 Third, there must be an absence of con-
flict with foreign law. 39 Applying the test to the facts of the
case, the court found that, although defendant's activities had a
substantial effect on United States commerce because of its con-
tinuing purchases of the underwear from the plaintiff in New
York, subject-matter jurisdiction did not exist. The court rea-
soned that T. Eaton was not a United States citizen, and there
was a conflict with foreign law due to the fact that T. Eaton had
already obtained a valid trademark of the name "Vanity Fair"
from the Canadian Registrar of Trade-Marks. 40
The Vanity Fair court, in interpreting Steele, placed much
weight on the citizenship of the defendant, opining that the
principal rationale in Steele was the "power of the United States
to govern the conduct of its own citizens upon the high seas or
even in foreign countries when the rights of other nations or
their nationals are not infringed."4 1 Therefore, in the context of
this rationale, failure to establish one prong of the test may
prove fatal to a plaintiffs Lanham Act claim, while failure to
establish two of the three prongs will certainly call for dismis-
sal.42 Subsequent to Vanity Fair, courts within the Second Cir-
cuit have re-evaluated the relative weight to place on each of
the prongs. Some decisions placed less weight on the comity
prong, construing the absence of foreign law broadly, and placed
34 Id. at 638.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 642.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 642-43.
41 Id. (quoting Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285-86).
42 Id. at 643.
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more importance into the inquiry as to whether the defendant's
activities had a substantial effect on United States commerce. 43
2. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit has not accepted the Second Circuit's in-
terpretation of Steele and has instead adopted a more compli-
cated balancing test. Ocean Garden, Inc. v. Marktrade Co.44
provides an illustration of the Ninth Circuit's analytical frame-
work. In Ocean Garden, the plaintiff, Ocean Garden, Inc.
(Ocean Garden), was a United States corporation which sold
canned seafood products. 45 The defendant, Marktrade Co.
(Marktrade), allegedly infringed Ocean Garden's trademarks in
selling canned seafood products in the Far East.4 6 Marktrade
never sold any of the products in question inside the United
States.47 However, the defendant canned the goods in Mexico
and shipped them through a United States foreign trade zone. 48
The Ninth Circuit applied what it coined the "jurisdictional
rule of reason test."49 The Ninth Circuit's test requires that the
defendant's activities have some effect on United States com-
merce, as opposed to a substantial effect on United States com-
merce. Such effect must present a cognizable injury under the
statute, and the interests and links with United States com-
merce must be sufficiently strong in relation to other nations.50
As to the third prong, which addresses the issue of comity, the
43 See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Arco Globus Int'l Co., 150 F.3d 189, 192 (2d
Cir. 1998) (stressing the importance of whether the defendant's conduct had a sub-
stantial effect on United States commerce); Aerogroup Int'l, Inc. v. Marlboro Foot-
works, Ltd., 955 F.Supp. 220, 229-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), affd, 152 F.3d 948 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (finding it significant that the Second Circuit has recently reaffirmed the
requirement that the defendant's activities must have a substantial effect on
United States commerce).
44 Ocean Garden, Inc. v. Marktrade Co., Inc., 953 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1991).
45 Id. at 502.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Wells Fargo & Co v. Wells Fargo Exp. Co, 556 F.2d 406, 427-28 (9th Cir.
1977). The court used the term in Wells Fargo & Co., but not in Ocean Garden.
50 Ocean Garden, Inc., 953 F.2d at 503. The court adopted this line of analysis
from Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 549
F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), an antitrust case addressing the issue of extraterritorial
application of the Sherman Act.
[Vol. 18:455
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court held that the district courts must consider seven factors:5 1
"(1) degree of conflict with foreign law;" 52 "(2) nationality of the
parties;"53 "(3) extent to which enforcement is expected to
achieve compliance;"54 "(4) relative significance of effects on
[the] U.S. as compared to elsewhere;" 55 "(5) explicit purpose to
affect or harm American commerce; '56 "(6) foreseeability of such
effect;" 57 and "(7) the relative importance of violations within
the U.S."58 Unlike the Vanity Fair test, which effectively re-
quires the plaintiff to establish all three elements, this test re-
quires the court to balance the three factors against each other.
Thus, the absence of one of the elements will not by itself prove
fatal to a plaintiffs claim.59
Applying the test, the court determined that the plaintiff
had easily established the first two elements. 60 Ocean Garden
claimed it had lost millions of dollars in revenue and, since such
revenues were lost in the United States, they were recoverable
under the statute. 61 The court then addressed the seven sub-
factors in the third prong of the test.6 2 The court found an ab-
sence of conflict with foreign law as there were no pending pro-
ceedings in foreign jurisdictions. 63 The court also found the
nationality sub-factor was satisfied since both parties were
businesses incorporated in California. 64 The defendant's princi-
pal place of business was located in the United States and,
therefore, the court found that compliance would likely be en-
forced in the United States.65 The relative effects on United
States commerce weighed toward the domestic side since the
plaintiff was a United States corporation which had suffered
51 Ocean Garden, Inc., 953 F.2d at 503.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 504.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Wells Fargo & Co., 556 F.2d at 428-29.
60 Ocean Garden, Inc., 953 F.2d at 503.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 503-04.
64 Id. at 504.
65 Id.
20061 463
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losses domestically. 66 There was substantial evidence in the re-
cord of the defendant's intentional infringement, indicating that
the defendant had the explicit purpose to harm United States
commerce. 67 In light of the court's finding with respect to the
preceding factors, the court held that the effect on commerce
was foreseeable. 68 Lastly, the court held that the relative im-
portance of the violations was great since the defendant had al-
legedly injured a domestic corporation through the
infringement.69
3. The Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit has developed a test which appears to be
a hybrid of the test in the Second Circuit and the test in the
Ninth Circuit.70 The leading case in the Fifth Circuit is Ameri-
can Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers Cooperative Ass'n.71 In
American Rice, both parties were United States corporations
selling rice both domestically and internationally under differ-
ent brand names.72 The plaintiff filed suit claiming that the de-
fendant infringed its trademark in selling rice to consumers in
Saudi Arabia.73
The court adopted the Second Circuit's approach but incor-
porated some elements of the Ninth Circuit's analysis. For ex-
ample, the court adopted the tripartite test in Vanity Fair but
required that the defendant's activities merely have "some ef-
fect" on United States commerce. 74 Also, the court rejected the
notion that the absence of any one of the factors is fatal to a
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 The Fourth Circuit has also interpreted Steele, but the court's test is ambig-
uous and the circuit has not clarified it since. See Nintendo of Am Inc. v. Aero-
power Co., 34 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 1994). Since its contribution to the issue
addressed here is insignificant relative to its sister circuits, it will not be discussed
in this Note.
71 Am. Rice, Inc. v. Ark. Rice Growers Coop. Ass'n, 701 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.
1983).
72 Id. at 410-12.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 414.
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plaintiffs claim.75 Therefore, the court found that a balancing
test would be the proper basis for the inquiry.
7 6
American Rice satisfied all three prongs of the analysis.
First, the defendant was an Arkansas corporation, thereby
meeting the requirement that the defendant be a United States
citizen.77 Second, the effect on commerce was more than insig-
nificant since the processing, packaging, and transporting of the
infringing goods all occurred within the country's borders. 8
Lastly, there was no conflict with foreign law because govern-
ment officials in Saudi Arabia never authorized the defendant
to use the mark.7 9
D. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction and Antitrust Law
Since the McBee court relied on antitrust law as guidance
in reaching its decision, discussion of the leading case and stat-
ute is necessary to comprehend the court's rationale for its hold-
ing. Unlike in trademark law, in the area of antitrust law
Congress has attempted to define the scope of the extraterrito-
rial application of the Sherman Act8 0 by passing the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (FTAIA).8 1 Codified in 1982,
§ 402 of the FTAIA provides that the Sherman Act shall not ap-
ply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than import
trade or import commerce) unless "such conduct has a direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on domestic com-
merce.8 2 The purpose of the FTAIA was to shield certain trans-
actions from liability because of their minimal or nonexistent
effect on the United States economy.8 3 Though Congress' inten-
tions in this regard were clear, it is unclear as to whether the
FTAIA's standard amends existing law or merely codifies it.84
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 414-15.
79 Id. at 415-16.
80 15 U.S.C.A. § 6 (1890).
81 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006).
82 Id.
83 1-7 MATTHEW BENDER & Co., FEDERAL ANTIRUST LAW Supp. to § 7.3 (2005).
84 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS
OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION, T 272h2 (2005).
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One of the leading cases involving the extraterritorial ap-
plication of the Sherman Act and the construction of the FTAIA
is Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California.8 5 In Hartford Fire, the
court held the Sherman Act applicable against London-based
insurers and reinsurers who conspired to make certain forms of
environmental insurance coverage unavailable within the
United States.8 6 The Court reasoned that the mere fact that
the foreign insurers attempted to engage in an unlawful con-
spiracy affecting the insurance market in the United States
caused a substantial effect on United States commerce.8 7 The
Court also dismissed the defendant's argument that since Brit-
ish law did not expressly prohibit the alleged conduct, a judg-
ment rendered in favor of the plaintiffs would create a conflict
with foreign law and, therefore, the doctrine of international
comity prohibited the district court from exercising jurisdic-
tion.88 The Court held that this does not state a true conflict
within the meaning of international comity because it is distin-
guishable from the situation where the foreign law requires the
defendant to conduct the challenged activity.8 9 In that case,
there exists a true conflict between domestic and foreign law
and the court should decline to exercise jurisdiction. 90
E. The Doctrine of International Comity
The doctrine of international comity in the realm of trade-
mark law is a slippery concept. In the briefs for both the appel-
lants and the appellees in McBee, the parties clearly disagreed
on the definition, as their interpretations of the doctrine di-
verged greatly. 91 Even still, it is possible to glean a more com-
85 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 760 (1993).
86 Id. at 769-70.
87 Id. at 796. Apparently, the Court found the foreign conduct's effect on
United States commerce rather obvious as its analysis consists of only one rather
conclusive sentence.
88 Id. at 798-99.
89 Id. at 799.
90 Id.
91 See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 28-33, Cecil McBee v. Delica Co., Ltd.,
No. 04-2733 (1st Cir. Feb. 17, 2005); Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 22-25, No. 04-
2733 (1st Cir. Mar. 22, 2005); Reply Brief of Appellant, Cecil McBee v. Delica Co.,
Ltd., No. 04-2733 (1st Cir. Apr. 8, 2005). While it could be argued that the parties
interpreted the doctrine of comity differently as an attempt to frame the law in a
light favorable to their respective clients, neither party cited any bright-line or
black-letter rule that is binding on the court.
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prehensive meaning of the one hundred year old doctrine. 92 In
reading the above-mentioned trademark cases, comity in the
most general sense means that if a foreign court or other legal
body has authorized the foreign defendant's conduct, then the
court in its discretion may decline to exercise jurisdiction be-
cause the judgment and remedy rendered in favor of the plain-
tiff will conflict with foreign law.9 3
Though trademark cases have not addressed the issue, the
courts have fleshed out a fuller definition of the doctrine of in-
ternational comity in the antitrust context. 94 In Laker Airways,
Ltd. ,95 the court spelled out what it considered to be the most
precise definition of the doctrine:
Comity summarizes in a brief word a complex and elusive con-
cept, the degree of deference that a domestic forum must pay to
the act of a foreign government not otherwise binding on the fo-
rum. Since comity varies according to the factual circumstances
surrounding each claim for its recognition, the absolute bounda-
ries of the duties it imposes are inherently uncertain. However,
the central precept of comity teaches that, when possible, the de-
cisions of foreign tribunals should be given effect in domestic
courts, since recognition fosters international cooperation and en-
courages reciprocity, thereby promoting predictability and stabil-
ity through satisfaction of mutual expectations. The interests of
both forums are advanced, the foreign court because its laws and
policies have been vindicated; the domestic country because inter-
national cooperation and ties have been strengthened. The rule of
law is also encouraged, which benefits all nations. 9 6
Flowing from this reasoning, the court expanded on its defini-
tion and marked where the principle does not have proper
application:
When a foreign act is inherently inconsistent with the policies un-
derlying comity, domestic recognition could tend either to legiti-
mize the aberration or to encourage retaliation, undercutting the
realization of the goals served by comity. No nation is under an
92 Though the precedent has questionable value today, the case of Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), is the first case in which the Court expounded in great
depth on the meaning of comity.
93 See supra Parts II.B, II.C.
94 See Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
95 See id.
96 Id. at 937.
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unremitting obligation to enforce foreign interests which are fun-
damentally prejudicial to those of the domestic forum. From the
earliest times, authorities have recognized that the obligation of
comity expires when strong public policies of the forum are viti-
ated by a foreign act.9 7
Although the court gave a specific definition to an otherwise
elusive concept, the judge still retains broad discretion in how
narrowly or how broadly he will apply the principle to various
fact patterns, especially in the area of trademark law in which
the courts have yet to fully develop the doctrine's meaning.
III. MCBEE V. DELICA, CO.
A. Facts
In the case of McBee v. Delica, Co.,98s the facts are largely
undisputed. The plaintiff, Cecil McBee, is a highly reputable
jazz bassist, enjoying a distinguished career spanning forty-five
years. 99 At the time McBee brought the trademark infringe-
ment action against Delica, McBee was teaching at the New En-
gland Conservatory of Music in Boston. 100 He had toured Japan
on several occasions from the early 1980s, performing in many
of its major cities, including Tokyo.101 McBee has since contin-
ued to tour in Japan. 10 2 He has never licensed or authorized
the use of his name to anyone, either in Japan or the United
States, except those in direct connection with his musical per-
formances such as an album.' 0 3 According to McBee, he has
sought to "have [his] name associated only with musical
excellence." 0 4
Delica is a clothing retailer based in Japan.10 5 In 1984,
Delica began to use the name "Cecil McBee" for its clothing and
accessories line which the retailer primarily marketed to ado-
lescent girls. 10 6 Delica obtained use of the trademark via the
97 Id.
98 McBee v. Delica, Co., 417 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2005).
99 Id. at 111-12.
100 Id. at 112.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
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Japanese Patent Office, which granted Delica the authority to
use the name "Cecil McBee" for a variety of product types in
both Japanese and Roman or English characters. 10 7 Delica
sells the "Cecil McBee" products only in the stores which bear
the name "Cecil McBee." s08 The company has not opened a
"Cecil McBee" store outside of Japan. 0 9 In 1996, sales of the
products in question approximated $23 million, which steadily
grew to $112 million in 2002.1 °
In selling the merchandise, Delica publishes a catalog con-
taining pictures and descriptions of the "Cecil McBee" prod-
ucts. 1 ' Written in Japanese with some English characters for
effect, the catalog is available in the retail stores located in Ja-
pan and certain other locations. 1 2 The catalog is sometimes
also included with the shipped packages of the "Cecil McBee"
products, 1 3 as are the telephone and fax numbers of a distribu-
tor, Opus M. Co., Ltd. Customers can contact this company to
order the products whereupon Opus will use Hamasho Co., a
shipping entity, to ship the merchandise. 114 Hamasho has
never shipped any "Cecil McBee" products outside of Japan."15
Delica's general business policy is to decline orders from the
United States. 1 6
In marketing the product, Delica founded a website, which
includes pictures and descriptions of the "Cecil McBee" products
along with the locations and telephone numbers of the retail
stores selling the merchandise." 7 Created in Japan, the web-
site is written almost entirely in Japanese, albeit, like the cata-
log, it contains some English words for effect." l8 The site
contains news about the clothing line, including promotions, yet
the site is merely informational and customers cannot purchase
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. Delica's website, which is still written almost entirely in Japanese char-
acters, can be located at http://www.cecilmcbee.net (last visited Sept. 19, 2006).
117 McBee, 417 F.3d at 112.
118 Id.
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the goods online.119 Like any website, it can be viewed from any
location in the world. 120 In addition, search queries for "Cecil
McBee" generally turn up both Cecil McBee fan sites and
Delica's website for his clothing line, but the two sites are dis-
tinguishable because the latter is written almost entirely in
Japanese. 12'
McBee initially became aware in 1995 that Delica was us-
ing the "Cecil McBee" name without his authorization for a
clothing line in Japan. 22 As a result, McBee retained a Japa-
nese attorney, who sent a letter to Delica requesting the com-
pany to cease using the "Cecil McBee" name. 123 Delica, of
course, declined whereupon McBee petitioned the Japanese
Trademark Office to invalidate Delica's use of the mark. 24 Af-
ter years of litigation in the Japanese court system, the Tokyo
High Court eventually held for Delica. 25 Subsequent to these
claims in Japan, Delica implemented a policy not to sell or ship
the "Cecil McBee" products to the United States and expressly
informed its managers throughout the company of the new pol-
icy. 126 The sole purpose of the policy was to shield itself from
liability in the United States. 27
McBee then devised his own strategy to establish jurisdic-
tion. 28 Beginning in late 2001 and continuing into 2003, Mc-
Bee hired private investigators who would attempt to purchase
"Cecil McBee" products from Delica and have them shipped to
Maine. 129 The investigators contacted the local retail stores in
Japan, but the requests for shipment into the United States
119 Id.
120 Id. See also supra note 116 and accompanying text.
121 McBee, 417 F.3d at 112-13.
122 Id. at 113. McBee initially contacted an American lawyer who advised him
that a trademark infringement action would most likely fail against Delica be-
cause Delica was not subject to personal jurisdiction in the United States. See id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 113.
125 Id. The Tokyo High Court's decision rested on two key elements. Id. at
113, n.1. First, Cecil McBee's full name was Cecil Leroy McBee and Japanese
trademark law only protects a person's full name from exploitation. See id. Sec-
ondly, McBee was unable to receive protection for the abbreviated version of his
name because it has not received general recognition in Japanese society. See id.
126 Id. at 113.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
[Vol. 18:455
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol18/iss2/4
RECONCILING GLOBALIZATION
were only of mild success. 130 While a few stores agreed to ship
the products directly to Maine, other stores offered to ship them
to an address in Japan where the investigator would have to
independently arrange for someone else to ship them into
Maine. 131 Still, others flatly declined to ship the products. 132
The total value of the merchandise shipped via both the direct
and indirect method was $2,500.133 McBee conceded that there
was no other evidence that Delica sold the products in the
United States.134 There was also no evidence that the goods en-
tered the United States after Delica sold them in Japan. 135
McBee stated that he found Delica's use of his name "un-
dignified, highly offensive and repugnant."136 He claimed that
Delica's use of his name confused American consumers causing
them to believe there is a relationship between him and the
clothing line where, in fact, none exists. 137 This confusion, he
argued, resulted in declining attendance in the courses that he
teaches.' 38 McBee also claimed that Delica's use of his name
confused Japanese consumers of his music causing them to be-
lieve that a relationship existed between him and the clothing
line.' 39 As a result, he argued, he has since received fewer tour-
ing opportunities in Japan.140
B. Procedural History
McBee filed a complaint on October 1, 2002 alleging trade-
mark dilution and unfair competition under the Lanham Act, as
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 113.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 113-14.
136 Id. at 114.
137 Id. Specifically, McBee asserted that people have asked him whether he
endorsed the products. See id. After denying any association with the clothing
line, McBee claimed that people do not believe him and that they often ask "both in
jest and with some degree of seriousness," whether he is "into young girls" - the
target consumer of the "Cecil McBee" clothing line. See id.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 114. McBee claimed that his audience became increasingly younger
over the years thereby resembling the core consumer of Delica's clothing line. See
id. He also claimed that he talked to one fan at a concert in Taiwan who presumed
a relationship with the "Cecil McBee" products. See id.
140 Id.
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well as other pendent Maine state law claims. 141 McBee based
his Lanham Act claims on false endorsement, specifically "that
the unlicensed use of his name has 'made a misleading and false
inference' that McBee endorses, approves or sponsors Delica's
product, and that inference has caused McBee harm."142 After
the completion of discovery, Delica moved to dismiss McBee's
complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, arguing that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdic-
tion over McBee's Lanham Act claims because Delica's activities
were extraterritorial conduct falling outside the ambit of the
statute. 143
Applying Vanity Fair, but with a modified second prong of
"some effect" on United States commerce rather than a "sub-
stantial effect," the magistrate recommended dismissal for Mc-
Bee's claims for injunctive relief but recommended that his
claims for damages go forward.14 4 Delica then appealed to the
district court arguing that McBee failed to establish subject-
matter jurisdiction for both his claims for injunctive relief and
damages. 45 The court, applying Vanity Fair, agreed with
Delica and dismissed McBee's claims. 146 When McBee renewed
his arguments on appeal in the First Circuit Court of Appeals,
Delica responded by arguing that federal courts lack jurisdic-
tion over all of McBee's claims.' 47
C. Interpreting Steele
In developing an analytical framework, the McBee court be-
gan its analysis by establishing a few important principles.
First, it noted the presumption against extraterritoriality which
states that, unless a contrary congressional intent appears, the
court must presume that Congress intended for the statute to
apply only to acts committed within the territorial boundaries
of the country.148 Second, the court also recognized the
landmark decision in Steele, which held that the courts may, in
141 Id. at 115.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 116.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 See id. at 116-17.
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some circumstances, apply the Lanham Act to reach extraterri-
torial conduct. 149 Hence, the Steele case stands for the proposi-
tion that the presumption against extraterritoriality does not
apply to the Lanham Act. 150 Further, the court acknowledged
that Steele never stated a precise test that the lower courts
must apply in determining whether to assert subject-matter ju-
risdiction over a defendant whose alleged unlawful conduct oc-
curred outside of the United States.151  The court did
acknowledge that other circuit courts have previously ad-
dressed the issue, but quickly noted that the three prongs in the
Vanity Fair test are given an uncertain weight and unnecessa-
rily confuse the various types ofjurisdictional issues in applying
the Lanham Act extraterritorially.152 For these reasons, the
court declined to adopt its sister courts' interpretation of
Steele. 153
Having identified the general issue, the McBee court then
launched into an analysis of Steele. The court first noted that
Steele held that "the Lanham Act conferred broad jurisdiction in
that its purpose was to regulate 'commerce within the control of
Congress." ' 154 Flowing from this interpretation, Steele marked
a distinction between an American defendant and a foreign de-
fendant.155 According to the McBee court, Steele found that
there was Lanham Act jurisdiction over an American defendant
who conducted his activities outside of the United States, but
whose activities nevertheless had an impact on United States
commerce.' 5 6 Since the defendant was an American citizen, the
Steele Court never defined the outer limits of Congressional au-
thority because the facts of the case clearly fell within the ambit
of Congress' power.' 5 7
The McBee court grounded its assertion on what it consid-
ered to be the twin propositions of the holding in Steele. First,
the Steele Court explicitly based its decision on Congress' power
149 Id. at 117.
150 See id. at 116-17.
151 Id. at 117.
152 Id. at 110-11.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 118 (quoting Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 286 (1952).
155 See id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
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to regulate "the conduct of its own citizens," including extrater-
ritorial conduct. 158 Accordingly, Congress has the unequivocal
authority to regulate the conduct of American citizens because
such regulation is a matter of domestic law and, thus, poses no
serious international concerns even when the citizen is located
outside of the country. 159 Second, Steele implicitly relied on
Congressional power over foreign commerce.1 60 While the Mc-
Bee court conceded that the Foreign Commerce Clause is never
cited in the opinion, it did point out that Steele found that the
defendant's conduct had an impact on plaintiffs reputation and,
therefore, on commerce within the United States.161 Hence, the
court concluded that "an American citizen could not evade the
thrust of the laws of the United States by moving his operations
to a 'privileged sanctuary' beyond our borders.' 62
In short, Steele only laid down the appropriate jurisdic-
tional analysis when the defendant is an American citizen. 163
In that situation, Congress' power to regulate its own citizens is
almost unquestionable.16 4 Consequently, the effects on domes-
tic commerce may play a less significant role in the analysis
when the defendant is an American citizen despite the fact that
the challenged activities were conducted abroad. 65 On the
other hand, a different analysis will apply when the infringer is
a foreign defendant and the activities in question are conducted
outside of the nation's borders. 66 Under the McBee court's in-
terpretation of Steele, Congress' authority rests on the foreign
commerce power.' 67 The McBee court dismissed any notion that
the foreign citizenship of a defendant will prove fatal in the
plaintiffs attempt to establish subject-matter jurisdiction. 168
Thus, the narrower issue before the court was what the plaintiff
needed to show to establish Lanham Act jurisdiction over a for-
158 Id. (quoting Steele, 344 U.S. at 285-86).
159 Id. at 118.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. (quoting Steele, 344 U.S. at 287).
163 Id. at 118.
164 See id.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 119.
167 Id.
168 Id.
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eign defendant for activities conducted outside of the United
States. 169
With a paucity of case law discussing the Lanham Act, the
McBee court turned to Supreme Court decisions in the realm of
antitrust law as a guide because the Supreme Court has had
more opportunities to address the question of extraterritoriality
in this context. 170 The McBee court found the case of Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. California'7' highly useful. In that case, the Su-
preme Court held that a United States court can exercise sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction over Sherman Act claims brought
against foreign defendants for activities occurring outside the
United States so long as the defendant's conduct served to, and
actually did, result in a substantial effect on commerce within
the United States. 72 The Hartford Fire Court also held that
comity considerations were not appropriate in the subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction analysis; rather, comity considerations were
more appropriately confined to the judge's discretion in deciding
whether to assert jurisdiction that it already possesses.' 73
Hartford Fire was dispositive in the McBee court's analysis
of the Lanham Act jurisdictional issue. 174 As a result, the Mc-
Bee court held that if a plaintiff is bringing a Lanham Act claim
against a foreign defendant, the court may assert jurisdiction
only if the defendant's activities had a substantial effect on
United States commerce. 75 If the plaintiff makes a sufficient
showing that the defendant's conduct resulted in a substantial
effect on United States commerce, then the court may proceed
to a comity analysis. 76 However, as held in Hartford Fire, com-
ity is a completely separate analysis in which the court may ex-
ercise its discretion in deciding whether to assert jurisdiction it
already possesses. 177 Accordingly, the McBee court's test differs
from the Vanity Fair test in two distinct ways. First, the sub-
stantial effects inquiry only pertains to the situation where a
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
172 Id. at 796.
173 See id. at 797-98.
174 See McBee, 417 F.3d at 120.
175 Id. at 120-21.
176 Id. at 121.
177 Id.
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plaintiff is attempting to assert jurisdiction over a foreign de-
fendant. 178 Secondly, comity plays no role in the subject-matter
jurisdiction analysis, but is instead a separate basis for the
court in determining whether to assert jurisdiction over a for-
eign defendant. 179
D. Application of the Framework
1. Claim for an Injunction Barring Delica's Sales in the
United States
McBee first argued that the district court erred in dis-
missing his claim for an injunction barring Delica's sales in the
United States. 80 The sole basis for his argument was the
$2,500 worth of goods sold to his investigators in the United
States.' 8 1 Since these goods were sold in the United States and,
therefore, entered United States commerce, the court should
have found subject-matter jurisdiction without inquiring into
whether such sales had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. 182
The court agreed with McBee's argument. 8 3 It emphasized
the distinction between domestic acts of a foreign infringer and
the foreign acts of a foreign infringer.18 4 The substantial effects
test only pertains to the latter because Congress' authority to
regulate goods within the United States and, therefore, in com-
merce is unquestionable.1 8 5 Since at least some of the "Cecil
McBee" products were directly sold in the United States, the
district court should have found subject-matter jurisdiction on
this basis alone.' 8 6 However, the court later held that the dis-
trict court should have ultimately dismissed the claim on its
178 Id.
179 Id. The decision to sever comity from subject-matter jurisdiction analysis is
unprecedented, as will be noted in Part IV. Indeed, the conventional wisdom is
that balancing requires the necessary flexibility in a globalized world. See Robert
Butts, Note, Trademark Law: Interpreting the Congressional Intent of the Extrater-
ritorial Application of the Lanham Trademark Act, 8 FLA. J. INT'L. L. 447, 469
(1993).
180 McBee, 417 F.3d at 122.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
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merits because the alleged confusion resulted from the sale of
the goods to the plaintiffs agents, which was a violation of sub-
stantive trademark law.18 7
2. Claim for an Injunction Barring Access to Internet
Website
McBee's second argument was that his claim for an injunc-
tion against Delica's posting of the internet website also did not
warrant extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act.188 The
court did not agree with McBee's argument.' 8 9 Granting relief
would constitute extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act
and, thus, McBee could only proceed with the claim if he could
show that the website had a substantial effect on United States
commerce.190
The court found that McBee failed to satisfy the substantial
effects test.191 McBee argued that the mere existence of the
website caused him harm because United States citizens can
view the website and may become confused as to whether there
was any relationship between McBee and Delica's Japanese
clothing company. 192 In support of this theory, McBee alleged
that he actually suffered harm from Delica's website because it
frequently appeared on search engines ahead of McBee's own
fan sites. 193 The court held that these facts were insufficient to
meet the requisite standard.194 It reasoned that it would be
"senseless"'195 to hold that the mere existence of a website
hosted in a foreign country and written almost entirely in a for-
eign language would, standing alone, be a legally dispositive
fact sufficient to warrant assertion of subject-matter jurisdic-
187 Id. at 128.
188 Id. at 123. McBee's argument touches upon an issue of hot debate between
scholars, specifically how the law should address internet websites as they pertain
to both issues of subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. For a com-
prehensive analysis of the issue, see Yelena Simonyuk, Copyrights and Trade-
marks: Recent Article: The Extraterritorial Reach of Trademarks on the Internet,
2002 DuKE L. & TECH. REV. 9 (2002).
189 McBee, 417 F.3d at 123.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 123-24.
195 Id. at 123.
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tion.196 Otherwise, the mere existence of a website would
render the limits on extraterritoriality meaningless. 197 The
court also noted that its holding was in accord with the law per-
taining to internet websites and personal jurisdiction. 98 As
with the principles under personal jurisdiction case law, more
facts are necessary to satisfy jurisdictional requirements, in-
cluding, but not limited to, interactive features which would al-
low customers from the United States to order the defendant's
products; such facts, however, were not present in McBee.' 99
Examining McBee's argument on the merits, the court still
found substantial grounds to dismiss the claim. First, the fact
that Delica's website was written almost entirely in Japanese
characters made it highly unlikely that any real confusion of
American consumers or harm to McBee's reputation would re-
sult from the mere existence of the website.200 Put simply, most
Americans would likely not be able to understand the web-
site.201 Second, McBee's claim that American consumers seek-
ing to obtain information about him through internet search
engines failed on its own terms because the internet searches
reproduced in the record all turned up sites of both McBee's jazz
career and Delica's clothing line on the same page. 20 2 Moreo-
ver, the sites were easily distinguishable from each other since
it was clear from the search results that the Delica website was
written entirely in Japanese characters. 203 Lastly, McBee
failed to allege any particularized facts indicating that at least
one American consumer had gone to the Delica website and had
became confused about whether there was an association be-
tween McBee and Delica's clothing line.204
3. Claim for Damages for Delica's Japanese Sales
McBee's third argument was that Delica's Japanese sales of
the "Cecil McBee" products constituted a substantial effect on
196 Id. at 123-24.
197 Id. at 124.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 124.
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commerce in the United States and, therefore, the lower court
erred in dismissing his claim for damages for Delica's Japanese
sales. 20 5 McBee divided his argument into two parts. First,
Delica's sales of the products in Japan tarnished his image in
the United States.20 6 Second, Delica's sales of the clothing line
resulted in a loss of income in the United States due to the loss
of his commercial opportunity as a jazz musician in Japan,
stemming from the tarnishing of McBee's reputation in Ja-
pan.20 7 Thus, both arguments related to McBee's tarnished rep-
utation, one at home, and the other abroad.
In addressing the first argument, the court recognized that
a plaintiff can successfully argue that unlawful use of a trade-
mark abroad has tarnished his reputation in the United
States. 208 A mere showing that American consumers have seen
the infringing mark can establish such an inference of reputa-
tional harm.20 9 However, no such inference is permissible
where the plaintiff has not shown that American consumers
have seen the infringing mark.210 In this case, McBee failed to
establish any specific evidence that American consumers have
actually seen Delica's products.211 Accordingly, McBee's first
argument lacked merit.212
The court faced an even greater difficulty accepting Mc-
Bee's second argument that Delica's sales confused Japanese
consumers, resulting in a decrease of McBee's record sales and
touring career in Japan.21 3 In contrast to McBee's first argu-
ment, this argument had only a loose connection to the core pur-
poses of the Lanham Act. 214 The statute seeks to protect
American consumers; alleging that trademark confusion on the
part of Japanese consumers caused McBee harm does not
closely tie into the purpose of the Lanham Act. 21 5 However, the
court acknowledged that Congress does have an arguably legiti-
205 Id. at 125.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 See id.
213 See id. at 125-26.
214 Id. at 126.
215 Id.
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mate interest in protecting American commerce abroad due to
trademark tarnishing in a foreign country. 216 Therefore, sales
diverted from American companies in foreign countries may be
legally significant in the analysis.217
Assuming that evidence of harm to a domestic plaintiffs ec-
onomic interests abroad resulting from the tarnishing of his
reputation in a foreign country may in some circumstances
meet the substantial effects test, McBee once again failed to
produce any evidence of such harm.218 McBee offered no evi-
dence in support of his allegation that, but for Delica's sales of
the "Cecil McBee" t-shirts' in Japan, McBee would have gained
more touring opportunities in Japan.219 Thus, he failed to prof-
fer any probative evidence of, for example, a decline in McBee's
touring revenue as compared to revenue gained from previous
tours or evidence of any decline in McBee's Japanese record
sales.220
Based on the foregoing analysis, the court held that Mc-
Bee's claims for injunctions barring both Delica's United States
sales and access to Delica's internet website, as well as his
claim for damages for Delica's Japanese sales, must be dis-
missed solely on the grounds that McBee failed to produce any
legally sufficient evidence which could satisfy the substantial
effects test.221 Since McBee failed to establish subject-matter
jurisdiction over Delica, the court found it unnecessary to dis-
cuss whether principles of comity would warrant dismissal of
McBee's claims. 222 However, the court did note in dicta that, in
any event, comity would counsel for dismissal of all of McBee's
claims. 223
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id.
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IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Substantial Effects Test: A More Streamlined
Interpretation of Steele
The following analysis of the McBee court's substantial ef-
fects test does not merely aim to determine whether the court's
application of its analytical framework is correct. Indeed, the
court's holding to dismiss all of McBee's claims against Delica
comports with a reasonable person's sense of justice, for it is
difficult to comprehend whether, considering the lack of evi-
dence, McBee could successfully establish subject-matter juris-
diction under any framework. Therefore, the importance of this
case is the court's interpretation of Steele and its decision to de-
part from the other circuits' interpretation of the landmark
case. In particular, this Section will analyze whether the
court's substantial effects test satisfies the important balance of
adequately protecting American citizens while simultaneously
confining the court's jurisdiction within the bounds that Con-
gress intended.
In the beginning of its opinion, the court clearly implied
that its desire for simplification would guide its reasoning. Af-
ter briefly describing the Vanity Fair test, the court stated that
"these three prongs are given an uncertain weight" and that,
based on Supreme Court case law, the court would "identify the
different types of 'extraterritorial' application questions and iso-
late the factors pertinent to subject-matter jurisdiction."224
Thus, the Vanity Fair test troubled the court mainly for the rea-
son that it did not provide clear guidance to litigants. According
to the McBee court, the test conflated the different types of ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction thereby resulting in the application of
a singular test for different fact patterns containing dissimilar
issues.225 Under this reasoning, the court correctly diagnosed
the problem that an unpredictable balancing test hinders the
statute's ability to balance the interests of American citizens
with judicial restraint.
With clarity and simplification as its primary motivation,
the McBee court rightly found that the unnecessarily compli-
cated subject-matter jurisdiction tests of its sister circuits failed
224 Id. at 111.
225 See id. at 110-11.
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to effectuate Congress' intent in passing the Lanham Act. In its
analysis, the court placed a heavy emphasis on the fact that the
defendant in Steele was a United States citizen, albeit located
abroad.226 For the McBee court, it was a legally significant fact
altering the analysis. 227 The McBee court treated Congress' au-
thority to regulate the conduct of American citizens abroad as
presumptively reasonable and unquestioned. 228 To have found
otherwise would have allowed an American citizen to merely
relocate outside of the United States and evade the long-arm of
federal law. 229 Restricting Congress' authority in this realm is
clearly unreasonable, especially in an increasingly globalized
world where American citizens can relocate without enduring
much inconvenience and, as a result, where national borders be-
come increasingly less significant.
Contrasting the McBee court's standard with that of its sis-
ter circuit's illustrates how the latter's interpretation of Steele
unduly constricted a court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Under
Vanity Fair, for example, it is certainly plausible that a plaintiff
could establish that the defendant is an American citizen, yet
fails to establish that the defendant's conduct had a substantial
effect on United States commerce and that judgment rendered
in his favor would not conflict with foreign law. As a result, a
court applying the Vanity Fair test would almost undoubtedly
dismiss the claim. Thus, the Vanity Fair test, as well as the
other tests which factored the citizenship of the defendant into
the analysis, restricted the -power of the statute to regulate its
own citizens and, to an extent, provided an incentive for Ameri-
can citizens to leave the jurisdiction in an effort to wholly evade
liability. In contrast, the McBee test correctly disaggregates the
citizenship of the defendant from the analysis. If the citizen is
an American, the inquiry ends and the court will find subject-
matter jurisdiction. Moreover, American citizenship will not
trigger an inquiry into comity.230 In sum, the court's framework
226 Id. at 118.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 In this way, the court wholly disregards an application of the doctrine of
comity where many had previously assumed it did apply. It appears that a court
will assert jurisdiction over an American citizen who obtains a valid trademark
from a foreign country. In the globalized economy, such an interpretation of the
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shifts the delicate balance toward protecting American
interests.
However, the more contentious issue is whether the McBee
court's test as applied to foreign defendants balances the com-
peting interests of judicial restraint and protection of American
citizens. As noted, the analysis is quite simple. The court asks
whether the foreign defendant's activities had a substantial ef-
fect on interstate commerce. 231 A negative answer ends the in-
quiry.232 An affirmative answer will trigger an analysis into
comity, which is a separate basis for a court to exercise the ju-
risdiction it already has over the claim.233 Also, the substantial
effects test is only applicable to sales of the mark outside of the
country.23 4 Domestic sales of the mark render the extraterrito-
riality test inapposite. 235 Thus, under the McBee court's test,
the dispositive issue is whether the foreign defendant's activi-
ties conducted outside of the United States had a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.
Evaluating whether the court's framework expands or re-
stricts a plaintiffs ability to establish subject-matter jurisdic-
tion against a foreign defendant requires a discussion not about
the court's conclusions but instead its rationale. Although the
court dismissed all of McBee's claims against Delica, the court
recognized the facial validity of many of his arguments. The
central, though not exclusive, problem for McBee was not that
his arguments lacked solid grounding in the law. Rather, Mc-
Bee's failure to establish subject-matter jurisdiction rested on
his continuous inability to provide sufficient evidence in sup-
port of his claims.
The court manifested its relatively expansive view toward
subject-matter jurisdiction in acknowledging the validity of sev-
eral of McBee's arguments. Regarding McBee's argument that
Delica's Japanese sales resulted in the tarnishing of McBee's
image in the United States and, therefore, required the court to
doctrine of international comity would, in theory, encroach heavily on foreign sov-
ereignty. Whether, as a matter of fact, the court's interpretation of comity in-
fringes on foreign sovereignty is an issue for further examination.
231 McBee, 417 F.3d at 111.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id.
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assert subject-matter jurisdiction over the defendant, the court
noted that his argument cut "very close to the core purposes of
the Lanham Act."236 After all, Congress has a clear interest in
protecting American consumers from trademark confusion. 237
Thus, McBee could establish a substantial effect on United
States commerce simply by providing evidence that American
citizens had viewed the infringing mark.238 The court went
even further when it said that "quite commonly, plaintiffs in
these sorts of cases can meet their burden by presenting evi-
dence that, while the initial sales of infringing goods may occur
in foreign countries, the goods subsequently tend to enter the
United States in some way and in substantial quantities."239
Unfortunately for McBee, he could not provide any such evi-
dence other than his own allegations that people observed wo-
men wearing Delica's clothing and the fact that one American
citizen traveling abroad, who saw Delica's advertisements while
in Japan, became confused upon entering the United States.240
As such, the McBee court adopted an appropriately expansive
view toward extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act; but,
this extraterritorial application is applicable only where, like
any legal theory, the plaintiff provides sufficient evidence to
support its burden of proof.
According to the McBee court, when a plaintiff alleges harm
in the United States as a result of the sales of products bearing
the infringing mark in a foreign country, he can establish the
requisite effect on interstate commerce through a showing that
the goods entered the United States in substantial quantities.
This requirement of proof provides an alternative way to view
the court's approach to the McBee fact pattern. Consider the
court's reliance on the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement
Act 241 (FTAIA) which concerns the extraterritorial application
236 Id. at 125.
237 Id. at 126.
238 Id. at 125.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006). The court, in dicta, reserved the question of whether
the plaintiff must establish that it was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant
that sales of goods bearing the mark would enter the United States as a necessary
element to warrant subject-matter jurisdiction, or whether, if shown, the plaintiff
need only show a lesser effect on domestic commerce. However, the court's lan-
guage, combined with its reliance on the FTAIA, indicates that the plaintiff must
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of federal antitrust law. The FTAIA requires, inter alia, that
the foreign defendant's conduct be reasonably foreseeable to
have an effect on United States commerce. 242 "Reasonably fore-
seeable" suggests that inadvertent entry of the alleged infring-
ing goods into the United States in small quantities would not
entail sufficient facts to meet this standard. The McBee court's
reliance on these authorities appears to require that plaintiffs
establish a sufficient nexus between the defendant's foreign
conduct and the effect on commerce. In other words, where the
plaintiff alleges domestic harm resulting from foreign sales of
the goods bearing the infringing mark, he must show that the
foreign defendant knew, or should have known, that the goods
in question would enter the United States in substantial quan-
tities after sale in the foreign country. Viewed through this
lens, the court is essentially cabining the foreign defendant's li-
ability for sales occurring outside the United States.
The foregoing approach also helps litigants comprehend the
court's definition of "substantial effect" on United States com-
merce in the context of internet websites, which is a continuing
problem for the courts in addressing jurisdictional issues. The
McBee court expressly stated that a website hosted in a foreign
country does not ipso facto subject the host of that website to
subject-matter jurisdiction under the Lanham Act.243 Instead,
the website must contain something more, such as interactive
features, which would allow people, particularly United States
citizens, to order the defendant's products. 244 Of course, a
showing of interactive features is not the exclusive means to
overcome the presumption that the mere existence of a website
does not automatically warrant the assertion of subject-matter
jurisdiction. 245 A website written almost entirely in English
could also add to the plaintiffs argument.246 In any event, the
McBee court's language here is significant. Similar to its rea-
soning for situations where the plaintiff alleges domestic harm
as a result of foreign sales of the product bearing the mark, the
show something more than inadvertent entry of the goods bearing the mark into
domestic commerce. See McBee, 417 F.3d 107.
242 McBee, 417 F.3d at 125-26.
243 Id. at 124-25.
244 Id. at 124.
245 Id.
246 See id.
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court is searching for facts indicating that it was reasonably
foreseeable to the defendant that the website would reach con-
sumers in the United States and, thus, act as an effective mech-
anism in bringing the products into domestic commerce. In
short, the McBee court sets an appropriately balanced standard
which reconciles the speed of information, fueled by the in-
ternet, with the need to preserve the essential value of judicial
restraint.
Comparing the "reasonably foreseeable" approach to the
substantial effects test of subject-matter jurisdiction with the
law of personal jurisdiction in the context of internet websites
further illustrates how the substantial effects test serves to act
as a restraint on the courts. In its analysis of Delica's website,
the McBee court defended its holding that the mere existence of
a website hosted in a foreign country does not have a substan-
tial effect on domestic commerce on the basis that its finding
was in accord with the law relating to websites in the context of
personal jurisdiction. 247 Otherwise, the law would eviscerate
the limits of state sovereignty that personal jurisdiction laws
serve to protect.248 Similarly, allowing for courts to assert sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction over a defendant on the basis that the
mere existence of his website has caused a substantial effect on
commerce in the United States would shatter the limits of con-
gressional authority beyond what Congress deemed neces-
sary.249 As such, the reasonably foreseeable approach to
defining the McBee court's test limits a court to hearing dis-
putes in which it has a legitimate interest.
B. The Increasingly Elusive Concept of the Doctrine of
International Comity
In applying federal statutes extraterritorially, and deter-
mining whether to exercise jurisdiction, comity has consistently
played a crucial role in the analysis; yet its precise definition
and a clear standard has continued to elude the courts and liti-
gants. In their respective briefs to the court,250 each party in
247 Id. at 124.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 28-33, Cecil McBee v. Delica Co., Ltd.,
No. 04-2733 (1st Cir. Feb. 17, 2005); Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 22-25, Cecil
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the McBee case argued why comity either did or did not require
dismissal of the case, but neither party ever precisely articu-
lated what the law of comity stated. Moreover, in attempting to
define the doctrine, the parties reached widely divergent theo-
ries. Thus, while the concept has existed for roughly a hundred
years in American jurisprudence, courts have yet to agree upon
a universal standard that should be applied to different fact
patterns. Consequently, analysis of the proper definition of
comity in the trademark context is necessary, especially when it
stands as a wholly separate analysis as it currently does under
the First Circuit's interpretation of Steele.
In contrast to the substantial effects inquiry which limits
when courts will find subject-matter jurisdiction over foreign
defendants, courts have not explained how comity, as a sepa-
rate basis for jurisdiction, will similarly affect the plaintiffs
ability to assert that subject-matter jurisdiction exists over a
foreign defendant. In the area of trademark law, the decision to
separate comity from Lanham Act subject-matter jurisdiction
analysis is unprecedented. Every other circuit court of appeal
interpreting Steele has maintained comity as a factor to con-
sider in the court's balancing test.251 Under Vanity Fair, if the
court found that the plaintiff established all the other factors
except comity then such failure may not prove fatal to the plain-
tiffs claim. As a result, comity principles factor much less into
the analysis when the plaintiff has otherwise set forth a strong
case for the court to assert subject-matter jurisdiction. How-
ever, the McBee test does not necessitate such a balancing anal-
ysis. 252 Having severed a critical factor from the test, it is
difficult to discern the weight to place on such a factor. The
narrower issue then is whether courts should interpret comity
narrowly or broadly.
Though it was unnecessary for the McBee court to inquire
whether comity would require dismissal because the requisite
subject-matter jurisdiction did not exist, its heavy reliance on
Hartford Fire sheds some light on how the lower courts should
construe the comity doctrine. In Hartford Fire, the court con-
McBee v. Delica Co., Ltd., No. 04-2733 (1st Cir. Mar. 22, 2005); Reply Brief of Ap-
pellant, Cecil McBee v. Delica Co., Ltd., No. 04-2733 (1st Cir. Apr. 8, 2005).
251 See supra Part II.
252 See supra Part III.C.
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sidered, among other issues, the proper definition of comity. 253
The defendant, a British corporation, argued that there was a
true conflict with foreign law because the challenged conduct
did not violate British law and, therefore, judgment for the
plaintiffs would result in a conflict between United States and
British law. 254 The court held that this does not state a true
conflict within the meaning of international comity because it is
distinguishable from the situation where the foreign law re-
quires the defendant to conduct the challenged activity. 25 5 In
that situation, it is not only theoretically but absolutely impos-
sible to comply with the laws of both nations if the court were to
render judgment for the plaintiffs. 256 Under this reasoning,
courts must strictly construe comity to mean a true conflict be-
tween domestic and foreign law.
However, "true conflict" takes on a different meaning in the
context of trademark law. In a footnote, the McBee court said
that "'it is one thing for the British reinsurers in Hartford Fire
to be barred under United States law from boycotting activity
that they might be free to engage in without violating British
law. But it is quite a different thing for the holder of rights of a
mark under German law to be ordered to refrain from uses of
that mark protected by German law."' 25 7 Hence, McBee's argu-
ment that it is theoretically possible for Delica to obey the laws
of both nations if a United States court issued an injunction
against him barring the use of the mark, as would be the case if
Delica were required to pay damages, lacked merit.258 In trade-
mark law, if the laws of the defendant's nation grant him the
lawful authority to use the mark, then the possibility of judg-
ment for the plaintiff would result in a conflict with foreign law
and, ultimately, dismissal of the claim. 259 Therefore, since
Delica was acting under the protection of Japanese law, a court
applying the McBee test would have to dismiss all of the plain-
tiff's claims regardless of whether McBee has otherwise
253 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797-99 (1993).
254 Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798-99.
255 Id. at 799.
256 Id.
257 McBee, 417 F.3d at 126 n.15 (quoting Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14
F.3d 733, 746-47).
258 Id.
259 Id.
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presented overwhelming evidence that subject-matter jurisdic-
tion is warranted. Furthermore, this is a broader application
relative to the more narrow interpretation seen in the area of
antitrust law.
Though the court's interpretation of comity appears reason-
able, the preceding hypothetical is an illustration of the conse-
quent problems associated with severing comity from subject-
matter jurisdiction analysis under the Lanham Act. In its deci-
sion, the McBee court overlooks important policy implications.
Consider the following scenario: assume McBee had produced
sufficient evidence that people in the United States had seen
Delica's shirts bearing the "Cecil McBee" name and that he had
provided sufficient evidence that the shirts, although sold in Ja-
pan, had entered into the United States in substantial quanti-
ties. Further, assume that Delica's website had contained
enough English words such that a normal English speaking
American could understand the website and that the website
allowed for online ordering of the "Cecil McBee" shirts. Given
these facts, a court applying McBee would find this to be an easy
case to assert jurisdiction over Delica. However, assuming ar-
guendo that the plaintiff can establish personal jurisdiction, the
question of whether McBee should proceed on his Lanham Act
claims rests entirely on whether Delica was acting under the
authority of Japanese law. Consequently, foreigners specifi-
cally intending to misappropriate the use of a trademark in sell-
ing a line of products can successfully shield themselves from
liability so long as they obtain the authority to use the mark
from the foreign country.
Congressional intent is frustrated when jurisdiction turns
solely on whether the foreigner acted under the protection of
foreign law because only the most popular names within the re-
spective country will be protected. A foreign governmental of-
fice charged with the responsibility of issuing trademarks will
most likely consider only the possible infringements that could
occur within its borders. Thus, McBee, although well-known in
jazz circles, is less likely to receive protection from foreign
trademark laws than are musicians or musical groups who rou-
tinely tour across the world and retain a high degree of name
2006] 489
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recognition. 260 As such, the Japanese Trademark Office, for ex-
ample, will be less likely to issue a trademark authorizing the
use of the name "U2" or "The Rolling Stones." Therefore, if a
foreign defendant continued to use the "U2" mark, despite the
government's refusal to issue such authority to use the mark,
the foreign band will be better able to seek protection from
United States courts than will a Cecil McBee, who, by virtue of
his name not being engrained into the global culture, cannot
seek such relief. Surely, one could not assume that Congress
intended only to protect the most well-known American trade-
marks from foreign harm.
Courts have avoided these consequences by incorporating
comity into the analysis and stripping its effect as a dispositive
factor, defeating otherwise legitimate claims of jurisdiction.
When the Ninth Circuit decided Hartford Fire, prior to its final
disposition in the Supreme Court, the court found a true conflict
with foreign law; nevertheless, the court asserted jurisdiction
due to the defendant's willful intent to target United States
commerce and the substantial magnitude of the effect on com-
merce resulting from the defendant's conduct. 261 Perhaps these
are sufficient reasons in the trademark law context for a court
to exercise jurisdiction despite the existence of a true conflict
with foreign law, but the court's opinion provides little gui-
dance. Indeed, the McBee court, in separating comity from the
analysis, noted that comity is properly understood as a separate
basis for a court to use "its discretion"262 when deciding whether
to assert jurisdiction it already has over a claim. This would
imply that a court, under some circumstances, may rule accord-
ing to the equities of the case but, other than this parsing of
language, it is quite unclear how the court views the degree of
latitude that the judge has in declining jurisdiction on these
grounds.
Without venturing beyond the limits of the court's decision,
there exists a resolution to the issue of whether an overarching
principle guides the judge in a comity analysis. This is not to
say that a judge must not have any discretion, but there must
be some guiding principle or clear standard that the judge must
260 See id. at 112.
261 Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 797-98.
262 See McBee, 417 F.3d at 111.
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use in exercising that discretion. Recall the case of Laker Air-
ways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines,263 an antitrust
case, which gives an answer. After acknowledging that comity
analysis is inherently a fact intensive inquiry, the court noted
that:
[T]he central precept of comity teaches that, when possible, the
decisions of foreign tribunals should be given effect in domestic
courts, since recognition fosters international cooperation and en-
courages reciprocity, thereby promoting predictability and stabil-
ity through satisfaction of mutual expectations. The interests of
both forums are advanced, the foreign court because its laws and
policies have been vindicated; the domestic country because inter-
national cooperation and ties have been strengthened. The rule of
law is also encouraged, which benefits all nations. 264
The court went on further to explain what could more plainly be
termed the public policy exception.
When a foreign act is inherently inconsistent with the policies un-
derlying comity, domestic recognition could tend either to legiti-
mize the aberration or to encourage retaliation, undercutting the
realization of the goals served by comity. No nation is under an
unremitting obligation to enforce foreign interests which are fun-
damentally prejudicial to those of the domestic forum. From the
earliest times, authorities have recognized that the obligation of
comity expires when strong public policies of the forum are viti-
ated by a foreign act.2 6 5
In interpreting both the general definition and the supposed
public policy exception, the court, in an era where it can expect
to adjudicate more claims that would not otherwise come before
the court but-for the increasingly free-flow of information,
should not construe the meaning of the doctrine and its excep-
tion such that it would amount to a nearly insurmountable
standard that the plaintiff cannot meet. In simplifying the test
for subject-matter jurisdiction, the court achieved an effective
balance in protecting American interests while not encroaching
on foreign sovereignty. Accordingly, harmonization of subject-
matter jurisdiction analysis and the comity doctrine is crucial
so courts can maintain that delicate balance.
263 See Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
264 Laker Airways, Ltd., 731 F.2d. at 937.
265 Id.
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With these concerns in mind, either the First Circuit or the
Supreme Court should adopt the third prong in the Ninth Cir-
cuit's jurisdictional rule of reason test as the test for the now
independent comity analysis. 266 A seven factor balancing test is
the appropriate framework in giving judges the discretion they
need to effectuate Congress' intent to regulate trademark in-
fringement broadly. Although balancing tests frustrate liti-
gants because their outcomes vary between judges and courts,
bright-line rules and rigid three-part tests are less favorable. It
is likely that these rules and rigid tests will lead to a far too
deferential approach to foreign sovereignty that is less
favorable to "Cecil McBee" plaintiffs who could otherwise set
forth an overall strong case for both jurisdiction and the sub-
stance of the claim. Such a result would be wholly inconsistent
with Congress' intent to protect American citizens and consum-
ers from harm.
V. CONCLUSION
From a legal reasoning standpoint, the McBee court's anal-
ysis seems correct and wholly reasonable. Simplifying the test
for subject-matter jurisdiction was perhaps not only necessary,
but also the most correct interpretation of Steele. More impor-
tantly, the court's approach is more in accord with Congress'
intent to regulate its own citizens abroad, as well as its intent to
protect domestic consumers. The court's opinion reaches the
outermost limit of congressional authority without unduly
threatening the sovereignty of other nations.
Moreover, the court's analysis is a resounding affirmation
of the timeless nature of the law. Many are all too quick to
point out that the law is too slow, or worse, unable to catch up to
today's rapidly changing technology. The court's analysis illus-
trates the lack of merit in that criticism. The court extracted
root values in the statute, as well as in the case law, and ap-
266 See supra Part II.B.2. Recall that the seven factor balancing test which
addresses the comity issue is the "(1) degree of conflict with foreign law;" "(2) na-
tionality of the parties;" "(3) extent to which enforcement is expected to achieve
compliance;" "(4) relative significance of effects on [the] U.S. as compared to else-
where;" "(5) explicit purpose to or affect harm American commerce;" "(6) foresee-
ability of such effect;" and "(7) the relative importance of violations within the
U.S." Ocean Garden, Inc. v. Marktrade Co., 953 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1991).
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plied them to a unique fact pattern in a way that effectuates
congressional intent while also preserving judicial restraint.
In any event, with a four way split among the circuits, the
issue is ripe for appeal and it would not be surprising if the Su-
preme Court grants certiorari on the issue. If the Court chooses
to do so, it should adopt the First Circuit's formulation for it is
the interpretation of Steele that best fulfills Congress' intent to
fully regulate and protect its citizens at home as well as abroad.
The Court would also be remised if it failed to develop a sound
legal theory of how the district courts should approach the com-
ity issue. Ultimately, it should adopt the approach taken in
Laker Airways, and add a fair construction to the substantive
meaning of the doctrine which is consistent with Congress' in-
tent to provide sufficient protection for American holders of
trademarks from unlawful foreign use of their respective trade-
marks. As noted, a balancing test is the best framework that
effectuates the legislature's intent.
Lastly, although analysis has centered on the judiciary's
role in defining a clear and workable standard for applying the
Lanham Act extraterritorially, Congress also has a significant
role in addressing the major policy issues in the area of trade-
mark law. The courts are ill-equipped to tackle a major policy
question outlined in Part IV- namely, how best to protect the
trademark holder whose mark does not bear worldwide recogni-
tion. The McBee court rightly decided not to address this policy
issue. It is more appropriate for Congress to address the matter
and Congress it should investigate whether this is, in fact, a
major problem in the globalized economy and, if so, whether it
should amend the Lanham Act accordingly.
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